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The Problem with Fourth-Generation War
Antulio J. Echevarria II
Strategic Studies Institute

For theorists of Fourth Generation War (4GW), there’s both
good news and bad news. The good news is that there is only one
problem with the notion of 4GW. The bad news is that the theory
itself is the problem. Like the fabled emperor who had no
clothes, 4GW is bereft of any intellectual garments: the concept
itself is fundamentally and hopelessly flawed. It is based on
poor history and only obscures what other theorists and analysts
have already clarified.
Although the idea of 4GW emerged in the late 1980s, it has
gained considerable popularity of late, particularly as a result
of recent twists in the war in Iraq. It is worth a moment,
therefore, to consider the theory’s basic premises.
In brief, the proponents of 4GW claim:
The first generation of modern war was dominated by massed
manpower and culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. The second
generation, which was quickly adopted by the world’s major
powers, was dominated by firepower and ended in World War
I. In relatively short order, during World War II the
Germans introduced third-generation warfare, characterized
by maneuver. That type of combat is still largely the
focus of U.S. forces . . . [4GW is an] evolved form of
insurgency [that] uses all available networks—political,
economic, social, military—to convince the enemy’s
decision makers that their strategic goals are either
unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.
(Armed Forces Journal, November 2004)
Unfortunately, this construct is misleading on several
counts. First, the theory’s sequencing of the so-called
generations of war is both artificial and indefensible.
Portraying changes in warfare in terms of “generations” implies
that each one evolved directly from its predecessor, and, as per
the natural progression of generations, eventually displaced it.
However, the generational model is a poor way to depict changes
in warfare. Simple displacement rarely takes place, significant
developments often occur in parallel. Firepower, for example,
played as much a role in World War II, and the Korean and
Vietnam conflicts as did maneuver, perhaps more. In fact,

insurgency as a way of waging war actually dates back to
classical antiquity, and thus predates the so-called second and
third generations (firepower and maneuver) as described by 4GW
theorists. Insurgents, guerillas, and resistance fighters
figured large in most of the wars fought during this period. Mao
was certainly not the first, nor even the most important,
theorist to articulate the virtues of insurgency, or Peoples’
war, as it was sometimes called. Clausewitz, for one, called it
a “reality (Erscheinung) of the nineteenth century,” and
provided some valuable insights into its nature. Insurgency did,
after all, help the American colonies win independence from the
British crown, and it nearly thwarted the ultimate Prusso-German
victory over France in the War of 1870-71. It played an
important role in the histories of many Latin America states,
and in Western Europe and the Soviet Union during World War II,
as well as enabling the emergence of Israel in the late 1940s.
Second, even if it were valid to portray major changes in the
conduct of war as an evolutionary progression from 1GW to 3GW,
the next logical step in that progression would not be the sort
of super-insurgency that 4GW theorists try to depict. Instead,
4GW would be closer to the vision of Net-centric warfare—small,
high-tech forces networked together in a knowledge-based system
of systems that enables them to act rapidly and decisively—
currently propounded by some theorists. To their credit, the
proponents of 4GW criticize Net-centric warfare for being too
dependent on high-technology, and for being too inflexible to
accommodate a thinking opponent. Yet, and quite ironically, this
is the very direction in which the logic of their particular
theory of military evolution would lead them, if they were true
to it. The logic they use to explain key developments in the
conduct of war, thus, actually undermines their case.
Third, by comparing what essentially amounts to military
means or techniques—such as massed manpower, firepower, and
maneuver—on the one hand, to what is arguably a form of warfare—
such as insurgency—on the other, the advocates 4GW only bait us
with a proverbial apples-versus-oranges sleight-of-hand. In
other words, they establish a false comparison by which they
wish us to conclude that most of the wars of the modern age,
which they claim were characterized by firepower or maneuver,
were narrowly focused on military power and, unlike the superinsurgencies of the information age, rarely involved the
integration of political, economic, and social power. Yet, even
a cursory review of the Napoleonic, and the First and Second
World Wars reveals that this is not true. Political, social, and
economic capabilities were, in many cases, employed to the
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maximum extent possible. Some historians, in fact, go so far as
to maintain that the First and Second World Wars were, in
effect, examples of “total” war precisely because of the extent
to which the major combatants mobilized the elements of their
national power. Even the theoretical offshoots of Net-centric
warfare, which 4GW rejects, recognize the need to integrate all
the elements of national power in the pursuit of strategic aims.
Finally, there is no reason to reinvent the wheel with regard
to insurgency as an effective form of war. A great deal of very
good work has already been done, especially lately, on that
topic, to include the effects that globalization and information
technologies have had, are having, and are likely to have, on
such movements. We do not need another label, as well as an
incoherent supporting logic, to obscure what many have already
made clear. The fact that 4GW theorists are not aware of this
work, or at least do not acknowledge it, should give us pause
indeed. In any case, the wheel they are attempting to create now
does not turn.
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